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ABSTRACT 
Chelsea Schein: The Unifying Moral Dyad: Liberals and Conservatives Share the Same Harm-
Based Moral Template 
(Under the direction of Kurt Gray) 
 
Do moral disagreements regarding specific issues (e.g., patriotism, chastity) reflect deep 
cognitive differences (i.e., distinct cognitive mechanisms) between liberals and conservatives? 
Dyadic morality suggests that the answer is “no.” Despite moral diversity, we reveal that moral 
cognition—in both liberals and conservatives—is rooted in a harm-based template. A dyadic 
template suggests that harm should be central within moral cognition, an idea tested—and 
confirmed—through six specific hypotheses. Studies suggest that moral judgment occurs via 
dyadic comparison, in which counter-normative acts are compared with a prototype of harm. 
Dyadic comparison explains why harm is the most accessible and important of moral content, 
why harm organizes—and overlaps with—diverse moral content, and why harm best translates 
across moral content. Dyadic morality suggests that various moral content (e.g., loyalty, purity) 
are varieties of perceived harm and that past research has substantially exaggerated moral 
differences between liberals and conservatives.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The existence of moral disagreement across the political spectrum is uncontroversial. One 
need only open a news-paper to see that liberals and conservatives are divided on many issues, 
including abortion, capital punishment, gay rights, women’s rights, gun ownership, 
environmentalism, euthanasia, and the justifiability of war. What is controversial is whether this 
disagreement reflects deep differences in moral cognition. Do liberals and conservatives have 
fundamentally different moral minds? One popular theory of moral cognition argues that liberals 
and conservatives rely on different sets of moral mechanisms (or foundations; Haidt, 2012). 
In contrast, we suggest that liberals and conservatives fundamentally have the same 
moral mind. Rather than distinct and differentially activated mechanisms, we suggest that moral 
judgment involves a common template grounded in perceived harm (the moral dyad; Gray, 
Waytz, & Young, 2012). This template is not only consistent with categorization in non-moral 
domains but also reconciles modern moral pluralism with historic harm-centric accounts, and 
provides hope for bridging political differences. In this article, we test six predictions of dyadic 
morality, which can be summarized as follows: Harm is central in moral cognition for both 
liberals and conservatives. 
Descriptive Diversity 
An important first step in science is collecting and cataloging diversity. Biology began 
with natural history, in which living organisms were collected from around the world and placed 
into taxonomies. The most famous biological taxonomy is Linnaean classification—proposed by 
Carl Linnaeus—which divides organisms into five different kingdoms based on their appearance. 
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The new renaissance of moral psychology also began with collecting and taxonomizing moral 
diversity based on descriptive appearance, akin to Linnaean classification. Anthropological 
accounts of morality in rural India were divided into three content areas of autonomy, 
community, and divinity (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997). One later account inspired 
by American political disagreement—Moral Foundations Theory (MFT)—taxonomizes morality 
into the five content areas of harm, fairness, authority, in-group, and purity (Haidt, 2012). 
Beyond providing a moral taxonomy, MFT also suggests differences in morality across 
liberals and conservatives, with only conservatives being concerned with authority, in-group, and 
purity. The idea of differences between liberals and conservatives is not new, as decades of 
research reveal that conservatives are more tolerant of inequality, are more religious, and believe 
more in a just world (for review, see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In particular, 
classic research on right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) reveals that conservatives are more 
submissive to authority, more likely to use aggression to protect the in-group, and more 
conventional in terms of sexuality (Altemeyer, 1988). 
Given that RWA demonstrates the sensitivity of conservatives to authority, in-group, and 
sexual/religious conventionalism, it is safe for MFT to suggest the same—especially given that 
MFT questionnaires about authority, in-group, and purity correlate up to r = .70 with the RWA 
questionnaire (Graham et al., 2011, Table 7, p. 377). Moreover, as RWA fully accounts for 
liberal-conservative differences revealed by MFT (Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014), one 
may wonder about the novelty of MFT claims. However, MFT does make one bold, unique 
claim—that these political differences arise from deep differences in moral cognition. 
Moral Modules 
Inspired by theories of basic emotions, MFT suggests that harm, fairness, in-group, 
authority, and purity each represent a distinct functional moral mechanism or cognitive module 
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(Haidt, 2012). MFT defines cognitive modules as “little switches in the brains of all animals” 
that are “triggered” by specific moral “inputs” (Haidt, 2012, p. 123). These modules are 
suggested to be ultimately distinct from each other, involving fundamentally “distinct cognitive 
computations” (Young & Saxe, 2011, p. 203), such that violations of one content area (e.g., 
harm) are processed differently from those of another (e.g., purity). 
This “distinct cognition” prediction is best explained by the MFT analogy of moral 
foundations as different “taste receptors” (e.g., purity as “saltiness”), such that each moral 
concern triggers only one specific receptor, which gives rise to a corresponding distinct moral 
experience. However, recent evidence casts doubt on claims of distinct cognition, as even harm 
and purity—often discussed as maximally distinct (Haidt, 2012)—are highly correlated (r = .87; 
Gray & Keeney, 2015). Moreover, the apparent cognitive differences between these two content 
areas stem from scenario sampling bias: MFT purity violations are weirder and less severe (e.g., 
necrophilia) than harm violations (e.g., murder), and it is these general differences that give the 
illusion of distinct cognition (Gray & Keeney, 2015). 
MFT also posits that moral modules are uniquely linked to specific emotions, such that 
harm is specially linked to anger and purity to disgust. Recent evidence also casts doubt on this 
claim, as links between moral content and emotion can be explained with broader affective and 
conceptual considerations (Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, in press; Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013). 
Studies that purport to find a unique effect of disgust on purity fail to control for other high 
arousal emotions, such as anger or fear, or use statistical procedures that ignore substantial 
shared variance between anger and disgust (Cameron et al., in press). 
Despite the lack of evidence for cognitive distinctness, the idea of moral “foundations” is 
intuitively compelling because it aligns with psychological essentialism—providing a deep 
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mental/biological explanation for important political differences. However, descriptive 
differences between liberals and conservatives—whether in personality, music preferences, or 
the moralization of specific issues—need not reflect cognitive differences. Even incredible 
diversity can be underlain by a common process. 
Common Cognition 
If science begins with cataloging diversity, its next step is often developing theories that 
explain this diversity with a common mechanism. In biology, Linnaeus and his contemporaries 
believed that each species was distinct and immutable, uniquely created by God. However, 
Darwin discovered that this incredible diversity stemmed from the simple algorithm of evolution. 
Could moral diversity also be underlain by a simple common mechanism? Could liberals and 
conservatives—despite their political disagreements—ultimately have the same moral cognition? 
Decades of research in cognitive psychology suggest that non-moral categorization 
decisions (is x a member of y category?) rely upon the process of template comparison. This 
template (or prototype) represents the most common, salient or important features across 
category instances (Murphy, 2004). Categorization decisions are made by comparing potential 
examples with this template, with closer matches being more robustly categorized as belonging 
to that category. For the category of “birds,” the template includes the features of “small,” 
“flying,” and “seed-eating,” which explains why sparrows are judged as more bird-like than 
penguins (Rosch, 1978). The same process occurs in social categorization, in which people are 
compared with cognitive templates called stereotypes (Smith & Zarate, 1990). 
The principle of parsimony suggests that moral judgments (is x act a member of the 
category immorality?) should also be made via template comparison. Acts should be compared 
to a moral template—or prototype—that extracts the most common, salient, and important 
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elements across instances of immorality. Moral psychology suggests many potential candidates 
for these elements, such as concerns about intention, causation, and outcome (Alicke, 2000; 
Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006; Malle, 2006); norm and affect (Nichols, 2002); and mind 
perception (Gray, Young, & Waytz, 2012). The concept of harm is related to many of these 
elements, and we suggest it forms the basis of a cognitive moral template. 
Dyadic Morality 
Harm can manifest itself in different ways, but within moral contexts, it typically 
involves the intentional action of one person causing suffering to a second person—a perpetrator 
and a victim. More technically, harm involves the perception of two interacting minds, one mind 
(an agent) intentionally causing suffering to another mind (a patient)—what we call the moral 
dyad (Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; see also Mikhail, 2007). 
The complementary roles of agent and patient stem from the two-dimensional nature of 
mind perception (Bastian, Laham, Wilson, Haslam, & Koval, 2011; Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, & 
Wegner, 2011) and the general dyadic structure of language (Brown & Fish, 1983) and action 
(Aristotle, BC350), in which agents act upon patients (Strickland, Fisher, & Knobe, 2012). The 
psychological power of a harm-based template stems not only from the presence of intentional 
harm in many canonical acts of immorality (e.g., murder, rape, assault, and abuse) but also from 
the affective potency of suffering victims (Blair, 1995), the hypersensitivity of agency detection 
(Barrett, 2004), the early develop-ment of empathy and harm-based concerns (Decety & Meyer, 
2008; Govrin, 2014; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and the obvious evolutionary importance 
of harm (DeScioli & Kurzban, 2013). 
It is clear that harm plays a key role in morality, helping to separate counter-normative 
acts into those that are immoral from those that are violations of mere social convention (Sousa, 
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Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009; Turiel, Killen, & Helwig, 1987). Dyadic morality provides a 
mechanism for the role of harm. We suggest that a norm violation “x” leads people to 
automatically ask “is x immoral?”—per-haps to the degree that x induces negative affect 
(Nichols, 2002)—which then activates the dyadic harm-based tem-plate. The more an act is 
inherently dyadic (i.e., harmful), the better the template matches, and the more robustly it is 
judged as immoral, explaining why murder is judged as more immoral than masturbation. 
Importantly, this process of dyadic comparison is intuitive and need not rely on effortful reason, 
like moral judgment in general (Haidt, 2001). 
Although a dyadic template should be reliably present during moral judgments, we 
acknowledge the influence of other domain-general psychological factors, such as 
misinterpreting affective arousal (Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) or rote learning (i.e., “the bible says 
abortion is wrong”). However, a dyadic template suggests that such misinterpretation and rote 
learning are easier with more harmful actions. Just as it is easier to rote-learn that a jerboa (a 
little desert kangaroo) is a mammal than a platypus (which non-prototypically lays eggs and has 
a bill), it should also be easier to rote-learn that abortion is immoral than to rote-learn that 
dropping the Torah is immoral. 
Importantly, we are not suggesting that moral cognition consists of only one moral 
module (i.e., a foundation) of harm. Dyadic morality, with its roots in psychological 
costructionism (Cameron et al., in press), denies the very existence of moral modules. This 
template is not an on-or-off “switch” but is instead a domain-general process that allows for 
gradations of harm. It is also activated no matter the con-tent of the norm violation—that is, even 
when an act initially seems harmless (Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014). Because harm represents the 
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essence of immorality, it serves as a constant backdrop in moral cognition—one that exerts a 
powerful cognitive gravity (Schein & Gray, 2014). 
The Pluralism of Perceived Harm 
Modular theories such as MFT have long argued against such a common template 
because of the ostensible existence of harmless wrongs. For example, scenarios of consensual 
incest carefully constructed to be “objectively harmless” are still rated as immoral by participants 
(Haidt, 2001). However, we argue against the very idea of “objective” harm. Harm, like 
morality, is in the eye of the beholder. In fact, both harm and morality are rooted in the 
ambiguous perceptions of other minds. Judgments of immorality require seeing a mind capable 
of doing evil, and judgments of harm require seeing a mind capable of suffering (i.e., an agent 
and a patient; Gray & Schein, 2012). 
The subjective nature of harm means that bizarre “harm-less” scenarios concocted by 
liberal researchers (e.g., masturbating with a dead chicken) may not seem harmless to their more 
conservative participants. Indeed, many studies document the perception of harm in “harmless” 
cases of religious blasphemy, anti-patriotism, and aberrant sexuality (DeScioli, Gilbert, & 
Kurzban, 2012; Kahan, 2007; for a full treatment, see Gray et al., 2014). 
Consider a case described by anthropologist Richard Shweder (2012): Oriya Hindu 
Brahmans believe it is extremely immoral for the eldest son to eat chicken immediately after his 
father’s death. Westerners fail to see this action as wrong—or harmful—viewing it as a mere 
matter of religious protocol, whereas Hindus consider it the eldest son’s duty to process the 
father’s “death pollution” through a vegetarian diet. When the son eats chicken, he “places the 
father’s spiritual transmigration in deep jeopardy” (Shweder, 2012, p. 96). By understanding the 
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perceived harm in these actions, even Western liberals can understand its perceived immorality.1 
Who can deny the immorality of condemning your father to eternal suffering? 
MFT interprets such perceived harm as mistaken, but dyadic morality sees these 
perceptions as legitimate. In the language of social anthropology, dyadic morality advocates for 
not only moral pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of different perceptions of morality) but also 
harm pluralism (accepting the legitimacy of different perceptions of harm). Harm pluralism 
suggests that different moral content such as purity and loyalty are (less prototypical) varieties of 
perceived harm. In contrast, MFT endorses harm monism, rejecting the legitimacy of harm in 
anything but direct physical or emotional suffering. 
Indeed, the very act of separating harm into a specific modular “foundation” denies its 
perceived existence in moral issues such as treason or sexual impropriety. The harm monism of 
MFT discounts the harm that conservatives see in matters of religious and sexual propriety (Gray 
et al., 2014). We suggest that this harm monism stems from the liberal bias in social psychology 
(Inbar & Lammers, 2012), which also once long denied the legitimacy of moral pluralism. 
Echoing the cries of moral anthropologists, we suggest that understanding harm requires cultural 
sensitivity (Shweder, 2012); moral psychology should prioritize the harm pluralist perceptions of 
participants over the harm monist theories of researchers. 
The Centrality of Harm for Liberals and Conservatives 
The diversity of harm provides the possibility for a unify-ing moral template in both 
liberals and conservatives. Rather than distinct moral mechanisms for each kind of moral 
content, dyadic morality suggests that immoral acts—even those of “authority” or “purity”—will 
activate a prototype of harm. Of course, some acts are more harmful than others, and dyadic 
morality predicts that increased harm (i.e., better template matches) will result in more severe 
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judgments of immorality. Consistent with past research on RWA, we acknowledge political 
differences between liberals and conservative—and the possibility that these differences may 
translate to some differences in moral judgment. However, we predict that moral differences 
between liberals and conservatives have been greatly exaggerated by MFT (a prediction 
consistent with Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; 
Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka, Morgan, & Wisneski, in press).We suggest that liberals and 
conservatives share the same dyadic template, rather than categorically different moral minds. A 
harm-based moral template predicts that harm should be central in moral cognition across both 
moral diversity (i.e., many different moral acts) and political orientation (i.e., for both lib-erals 
and conservatives). Because centrality is a relatively broad concept, we operationalize it through 
six specific hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1: Accessibility): Harm is most cognitively accessible across moral 
diversity and political orientation (Study 1). 
Hypothesis 2 (H2: Importance): Harm is most important across moral diversity and 
political orientation (Studies 2 and 3). 
Hypothesis 3 (H3: Organization): Harm organizes judgments of immorality across moral 
diversity and political orientation (Study 4). 
Hypothesis 4 (H4: Overlap): Harm overlaps substantially with other moral concerns 
across political orientation (Study 5). 
Hypothesis 5 (H5: Translation): Harm is the best lingua franca for translating across 
moral diversity and political orientation (Study 6). 
Hypothesis 6 (H6: Association): Harm is more implicitly associated with moral diversity 
than descriptively similar concerns, across political orientation (Study 7). 
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Accessibility (H1) Classic studies in cognitive social psychology reveal that prototypical 
examples are most cognitively accessible (Murphy, 2004).  This accessibility explains why 
people who generate an example of a category (e.g., dog) generate an example that is 
prototypical (e.g., a Golden Retriever) rather than non-prototypical (e.g., a Xoloitzcuintli). 
Dyadic morality predicts that when both liberals and conservatives are asked to recall an 
example of “immorality,” they will recall an action that is harmful, rather than “disloyal” or 
“impure” (Study 1). 
Importance (H2) Research reveals that prototypical elements are most diagnostic for 
category judgments (e.g., the presence of wings is more diagnostic for whether something is a 
bird than the presence of eyes). The centrality of harm suggests that the pres-ence or absence of 
harm should be the most important criterion in moral judgments across moral diversity (Studies 2 
and 3). In other words, relatively harmful acts should be most immoral, and relatively harmless 
acts should be least immoral. 
We should note that maximal accessibility and importance of harm is technically 
consistent with distinct moral modules, such that harm might merely be the most important of 
multiple modules. However, MFT discusses moral concerns as if they are equally important and 
explicitly claims that “conservatives endorse all five foundations more or less equally” (Haidt, 
2012, p. 187). Instead, we predict that both liberals and conservatives will view harm as the most 
important moral content, consistent with some recent research (Frimer et al., 2013). In contrast to 
statements of MFT that liberals have a deficient “two-foundation morality” (Haidt, 2012, p. 159), 
we also expect to find overall similarity in the endorsement of loyalty, authority, and purity 
between liberals and conservatives when these concerns are detached from specific issues (e.g., 
patriotism, gay marriage). 
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Organization (H3) One hypothesis that would distinguish “harm as common template” 
from “harm as most important module” is whether harm can meaningfully organize moral 
diversity. Distinct moral modules suggest a process of categorization (i.e., moral judgment) in 
which purity violations (e.g., bestiality) are evaluated by their impurity but not their harm. This 
separation of moral concerns means that perceptions of harm should not be able to meaningfully 
predict the immorality of non-harm transgressions. 
Consider again the modular analogy of morality as distinct tastes (Haidt, 2012). If you 
had a set of foods that were purely sweet (and contained no salt), then it should not be possible to 
meaningfully organize these foods based on saltiness (beyond saying that they contained none). 
Said another way, the question “What is saltier: brown sugar or white sugar?” is meaningless, 
because they both entirely lack salt. Likewise, distinct moral modules suggest that the question 
“What is more harmful: bestiality or pornography?” is similarly meaningless because both are 
“purity” violations. 
Conversely, harm pluralism and dyadic morality suggest that judgments of any potential 
moral infraction involve some perception of harm and the activation of a dyadic template. The 
process of dyadic comparison (i.e., template matching) suggests that even infractions of fairness, 
loyalty, authority, and purity are automatically organized on a gradient of harm. We test the 
organizational power of harm in both liberals and conservatives with an implicit judgment task, 
using speeded judgments of immorality and harm across moral diversity (Study 4). 
Overlap (H4) Harm may meaningfully organize moral diversity, but one could argue that 
there may be many such potentially meaningful dimensions—perhaps one for each moral 
concern. Already, such an argument is inconsistent with strong modular accounts because 
dimensions represent fuzzy gradients rather than encapsulated mechanisms. Nevertheless, 
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suppose a weaker modular account that acknowledges the possibility of many dimensions, with 
harm being the most important. The question then becomes whether these dimensions are distinct 
from harm (and from each other). A key assumption of distinct moral modules is obviously 
distinctness, as such moral infractions are thought to activate one moral concern and not others 
(for a broader discussion, see Cameron et al., in press). 
To test this claim of distinctness, we use scenarios specifically designed by MFT to 
activate one—and only one—type of moral content. Consistent with dyadic morality, we expect 
that distinctness will be lacking. Such conceptual overlap has already been observed in past 
research, as moral judgments between “foundations” are so highly correlated that many 
methodologists would consider them collinear (e.g., r = .87; Gray & Keeney, 2015). This overlap 
likely explains why factor analyses of moral foundation items only yield five factors when using 
confirmatory factor analyses with fit indices biased toward significance by large sample sizes (N 
= 34,476 in Graham et al., 2011). 
If the overlap between moral content is sufficiently high for both liberals and 
conservatives, then we may question the predictive utility of treating fairness, loyalty, authority, 
and purity as separate concepts. Importantly, if harm is the most important dimension (H2), then, 
consistent with dyadic morality, substantially overlapping moral content may be best predicted 
and explained by harm. In other words, different moral content may be best understood as 
varieties of perceived harm. 
Translation (H5) Substantial overlap between moral concerns—and the maxi-mal 
importance of harm—allows for the possibility that all moral infractions may be translated 
through a common language of harm. Modular accounts have suggested that different moral 
concerns represent different moral languages and that each language is distinct and ultimately 
   
13
untranslatable (or more technically, incommensurable; Haidt, 2012). This means that it should be 
difficult or impossible, for example, to compare the relative immorality of a purity violation with 
that of a loyalty violation. Conversely, a common dyadic template suggests the possibility that 
various moral languages can be translated through harm for both liberals and conservatives 
(Study 6). Whether a purity or loyalty violation is worse is best answered by a simple question—
Which transgression is seen as more harmful? 
Association (H6) Some moral transgressions cluster together descriptively. For example, 
people’s judgments regarding patriotism violations (i.e., loyalty) are good predictors of their 
judgments regarding sexual conduct (i.e., purity), because both are elements of RWA 
(Altemeyer, 1988). However, if diverse moral judgments are translated best through harm, it 
suggests that harm should be—cognitively speaking—more closely linked to descriptively 
dissimilar moral concerns (e.g., purity) than other descriptively similar concerns (e.g., loyalty; 
Study 7). We test implicit cognitive associations between moral content for both liberals and 
conservatives with the implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). 
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CHAPTER 2: Study 1: Recalling Immorality 
Study 1 tests whether harm is most cognitively accessible for both liberals and 
conservatives (H1: Accessibility) using spontaneous recall. If a dyadic template is central to 
moral cognition, then dyadic violations (those involving an obvious agent and patient, such as 
murder, rape, and theft) should be spontaneously recalled with greater frequency than ostensibly 
harmless “purity” violations (e.g., sexual deviance). 
Method  
Participants 
One hundred three participants completed the study on Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk). Twenty-two participants failed the instructional manipulation check, and 2 participants 
failed to follow instructions (instead listing random words), leaving 79 participants (51% male,  
Mage = 35, 56% liberal). 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to “list an act that is morally wrong” and to “write down 
whatever comes to your mind first.” No other instructions were given to ensure that responses 
were as natural as possible. After the act was listed, it was looped back to participants, who then 
selected which one of five adjectives (harmful, unfair, disloyal, disobedient, and gross) it best 
represented. These adjectives were taken directly from moral foundations research (Graham, 
Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).2 To avoid influencing participants in advance of listing their immoral 
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act, they did not see these category labels until after they listed it. Then, participants completed 
demographics questions (politics ranging from 1 = strongly liberal to 7 = strongly conservative, 
gender, age, country) and the instructional manipulation check. Consistent with past work (Haidt, 
2012), we define liberals here and else-where as those who respond 1 through 3 on the political 
scale and conservatives as those who respond 4 through 7. 
Results 
Words Recalled 
See Figure 1 for a word map of recalled violations. More than 90% of recalled violations 
are dyadic in nature and display clear interpersonal harm (murder 44%, stealing 17%, adultery 
11%, abuse 7%, cheating 5%, rape 4%, lying 2%). 
Content Rating 
Examining participant labels revealed that 68% of participants categorized their first act 
recalled as harmful, 9% labeled it as unfair, 14% labeled it as disloyal, 8% labeled it as 
disobedient, and 1% labeled it as gross. There was some diver-sity on how people categorized 
that same act (14 people recalled stealing, and of those, 5 labeled it as harmful, 4 unfair, 1 dis-
loyal, and 4 disobedient). This diversity suggests overlap between moral content, arguing against 
strong claims of distinctness. A chi-square revealed that participants labeled their acts as harmful 
more than any other content area, χ2(1, N = 79) = 12.96, p < .001, and this tendency did not 
differ by political affiliation, χ2(1, N = 79) = 0.59, p = .44 (see Figure 2). As predicted by a 
dyadic template, canonically harmful violations were the most accessible for both liberals and 
conservatives. 
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CHAPTER 3: Study 2: Imagine Yourself As an Anthropologist 
In this study, we test the importance of different moral concerns across liberals and 
conservatives by presenting participants with acts described as harmful, unfair, disloyal, 
disobedient, and impure. Using these content descriptions directly taps these moral concerns 
(e.g., purity) independently of political dis-agreement on specific issues (e.g., gay rights). 
Removed from specific issues, we expected overall similarity in moral judgments across liberals 
and conservatives. Most importantly, a dyadic template predicts that harm should be the most 
important predictor of moral wrongness because it is most representative of the category 
“immorality” (H2: Importance). 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred eleven participants completed the study through mTurk. Nine participants failed the 
attention check, leaving 102 participants (39% female, Mage = 36, 51% lib-eral, all U.S. 
residents). 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to imagine themselves as an anthropologist studying a foreign tribe. One 
day, they overhear that a tribesmen has performed an act that is harmful, unfair, disloyal, 
disobedient, or impure. For example, the description for harm was “the tribesman performed a 
harmful action that caused others to suffer either emotionally or physically.” These content 
descriptions were taken directly from moral foundations research (Graham et al., 2009). After 
each story, participants rated the immorality and wrongness of each act and whether the 
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tribesman should be punished, all on 5-point scales from Definitely Not/Not at All (1) to 
Definitely Yes/Extremely (5), which were collapsed into an immorality index (all αs > .76). 
Participants rated all five scenarios in random orders then completed demographics questions as 
in Study 1. 
Results and Discussion 
A 5 (within: Act Description) × 2 (between: Political Affiliation) mixed ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of act, F(4, 400) = 72.74, p < .001, η2 = .42, such that both 
liberals and conservatives rated harmful acts as significantly more immoral than unfair, disloyal, 
disobedient, and impure acts, all ps < .001, with the exception of unfair in liberals,  p = .14 (see 
Figure 3). Given that unfair violations are fundamentally dyadic (see Study 1), these data are 
consistent with a dyadic template. There was no main effect of politics,  F(1, 100) = 0.70, p = 
.41, η2 = .007, but there was a significant interaction between act and politics, F(4, 400) = 3.98, 
p = .004, η2 = .04. This interaction was driven by a single difference: Consistent with past 
theorizing (Altemeyer, 1988; Graham et al., 2009), conservatives (M = 3.19, SD = 0.93, 
confidence interval [CI] = [2.91, 3.48]) rated standards of impurity and decency as relatively 
more important than liberals (M = 2.71, SD = 1.08, CI = [2.44, 2.99], p = .02). We should note 
that this difference was not replicated in the next study. 
Consistent with a dyadic template, harm appeared to be the most important moral concern 
across moral diversity for both liberals and conservatives.3 In addition, the political differences 
revealed were much smaller than might be expected. Liberals do not only care about harm and 
fairness but also endorse disloyalty and disobedience at similar levels as conservatives (see 
Frimer et al., 2013; Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013). In this study, liberals also endorsed purity 
concern at 80% of the extent of conservatives. In other words, despite claims that liberals and 
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conservatives have fundamentally different moral considerations, we observed overwhelming 
similarity when these considerations were assessed directly rather than via specific political 
issues  (e.g., patriotism, chastity). 
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CHAPTER 4: Study 3: X but Not Y Judgments 
The previous study revealed the importance of harm in moral cognition. However, as past 
research finds that people see harm in even ostensibly “harmless” purity and loyalty viola-tions 
(Gray et al., 2014), we may not have best isolated  perceptions of harm. Therefore, in this study, 
participants read about the acts in Study 2 described as possessing one moral content but not 
other moral content (e.g., disloyal but not harmful). Consistent with Study 2, we predicted to 
observe the overall importance of harm in moral judgment  (H2: Importance) and find few 
descriptive differences between liberals and conservatives. 
Method 
Participants 
One hundred eleven participants completed the study through mTurk. Of the initial 111 
participants, 6 people failed the attention check, leaving 105 participants  (59% male, Mage = 33, 
58% liberal). 
Procedure 
Participants rated 20 acts which were described as being X but not Y, with X and Y 
referring to MFT definitions of harm, unfairness, disloyalty, disobedience, and impurity. For 
example, the harm but not fairness scenario was “the tribesman performed a harmful action that 
caused others to suffer either emotionally or physically. However, the tribes-man did not act 
unfairly and people were not denied their rights.” Participants assessed immorality as in Study 2, 
and these three items were combined into an immorality index  (α = .82). 
Results and Discussion 
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To directly compare the importance of each kind of moral content on moral judgments, 
we took the difference between two complementary stories. For example, immorality ratings for 
“harm but not disloyal” minus those from “disloyal but not harm” yield the unique power of 
harm versus disloyalty to predict immorality.4 To analyze these “asymmetry scores,” a one-
sample t test was used with 0 as the test value (i.e., 0 connotes no asymmetry such that each type 
of moral content is equally important for moral judgments). As predicted, harm was a better 
predictor of immorality than all other moral content, ts(104) > 3.19, ps < .003. These t-values 
were converted into odds ratios to reveal exactly how much more important harm is compared 
with other content (see Figure 4). For example, harm is 5 times more important than impurity 
and 8 times more important than disloyalty in predicting judgments of immorality. 
Contrasting liberals and conservatives revealed only 1 difference among asymmetry 
scores (out of a possible 10): Conservatives placed more emphasis on disloyalty versus 
unfairness than liberals, t(103) = 2.69, p = .008, a relative difference consistent with past 
research (Graham et al., 2009). However, other similarly suggested moral differences across 
liberals and conservatives in disobedience and purity were not replicated (nor were the 
differences in purity found in Study 2). As in Study 2, we found overwhelming similarity 
between liberals and conservatives in their endorsement of descriptive concerns. More 
importantly, this study revealed that—to the extent that moral content can be separated5—harm 
is by far the more important predictor of immorality for both liberals and conservatives, 
consistent with a common cognitive dyadic template. 
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CHAPTER 5: Study 4: Reaction Times (RTs) to Immorality 
The previous studies suggest that harm is both maximally accessible and important across 
political orientation and moral diversity. In this study, we assess whether harm can structure 
moral diversity by predicting immorality ratings across various acts (H3: Organization). 
Demonstrating such organization with even ostensibly “harmless” acts would suggest the 
operation of dyadic comparison (i.e., template matching) across moral diversity, just as a dyadic 
template predicts. 
As dyadic comparison is hypothesized to be intuitive and automatic, we used an implicit 
measure—RT—to assess both perceptions of harm and immorality. For both liberals and 
conservatives, we predicted that RTs (i.e., categorization speed) of harm judgments would 
predict RTs of immorality judgments, even for ostensibly harmless actions (e.g., por-nography), 
and even when controlling for general negativity and general RT. 
Method 
Participants.  
Ninety-five participants completed the study through mTurk. Four participants were 
excluded from analysis for failing to complete all trials, and 4 additional participants were 
excluded for inaccurately categorizing neutral words (e.g., wallpaper) as immoral, leaving 87 
participants (52% female, Mage = 36, 62% liberal). 
Procedure.  
Participants rated 40 words—20 moral terms (e.g., murder, pornography), 10 negative 
control words (e.g., feces, germs), and 10 control words (e.g., furniture, jumping)—on three 
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criteria, including whether the act was immoral, whether the act was harmful, and whether the 
act was unpleasant. 
RT studies are highly sensitive to factors such as word frequency and length, so 
“unpleasant” served as a control for both low-level word characteristics (i.e., familiarity and 
length) and general negativity. At the start of each trial, partici-pants saw 2 words on the top 
corners of their screens “Immoral/Not Immoral,” “Harmful/Not Harmful,” or “Unpleasant/Not 
Unpleasant.” Participants then categorized each target word accordingly (presented in the center 
of the screen). To simplify the task, participants completed the trials in randomly pre-sented 
blocks (immoral, harm, and unpleasant) in which they categorized all 40 words according to a 
single criterion. 
Results 
RT data are particularly sensitive to noise, so RTs greater than 3,000 ms or under 300 ms 
were cut from analysis (1.3% of all trials) as these times reflect non-implicit reactions. Harmful 
RTs, unpleasant RTs, politics, and all interactions between these terms were entered as fixed 
factors in a random-intercept multi-level model predicting immorality RTs for the 20 immoral 
actions (see Figure 5). As predicted, harmful RT significantly predicted immorality RT, β = .19, 
SE = 0.03, p < .001, CI = [0.13, 0.24], even when controlling for unpleasant RT, β = .12, SE = 
0.03, p < .001, CI = [0.06, 0.17]. There was no main effect of politics, β = −4.35, SE = 11.48, p = 
.71, CI = [−27.13, 18.48], and no significant interaction between politics and harm RT, β = 
−.007, SE = 0.02, p = .68, CI = [−0.04, 0.03], or unpleasant RT, β = .01, SE = 0.02, p = .45, CI = 
[−0.02, 0.05] (see Figure 6). The lack of difference across politics suggests that implicit moral 
cognition is the same across liberals and conservatives (consistent with past work, Gray et al., 
2014; Wright & Baril, 2011), just as a common dyadic template predicts. 
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As a more stringent test of the organizational power of harm across moral diversity, we 
reran analyses without the “harmful” and “unfair” violations (new list: adultery, bestiality, 
betrayal, cannibalism, disrespect, incest, pornography, and prostitution). As before, harm RT 
significantly predicted the RT of immorality of these “harmless” violations, β = .26, SE = 0.04, z 
= 5.80, p < .001, CI = [0.17, 0.35], when control-ling for politics and unpleasantness. In other 
words, harm provides an organizational framework for even “harmless” moral transgressions, 
consistent with the process of dyadic comparison. 
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CHAPTER 6: Study 5: Correlations Between Moral Content 
Study 4 revealed that harm forms an organizing dimension across moral content, but 
there may be other such dimensions corresponding to other content (e.g., disloyalty). Notably, 
these dimensions are only important if they represent inde-pendent dimensions. Studies 2 and 3 
revealed that harm is the most important consideration within morality, and so any overlap 
between harm and other content areas is therefore most meaningfully characterized by harm. 
In this study, we test the distinctness of moral concerns by presenting participants with 
scenarios specifically designed by moral foundations researchers to exemplify a single moral 
con-cern (Graham et al., 2009). We then assessed the moral content of each story with words 
drawn directly from the moral foundations “dictionary” (Graham et al., 2009)—again chosen by 
MFT researchers to represent a single moral concern. Despite these targeted scenarios and 
descriptors, dyadic morality sug-gests that moral concerns will overlap substantially. 
Method 
Participants. 
 One hundred seven participants finished the study through mTurk. Fifteen participants 
failed the instructional manipulation check, and 4 failed the experimental manipulation check by 
claiming that moral violations were “friendly.” These exclusions left 88 participants (Mage = 39, 
51% male, Mage = 31, 57% liberal). 
Procedure. 
 Participants rated 10 different acts, 2 drawn from each of five content areas: harm (kick 
dog, insult overweight person), fairness (steal from poor, hire only people of own race), 
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disloyalty (burn country flag, break from family), dis-obedience (cursing nation’s heroes, throw 
tomato at politician), and impurity (eat dead dog, engage in dehumanizing performance art). 
Participants then rated how well 12 different adjectives describe the action. The adjectives 
consisted of two words from each content area: harm (harmful, cruel), unfair (unfair, prejudiced), 
disloyal (disloyal, treacherous), disobedient (disobedient, disrespectful), and impure (impure, 
perverted), as well as two positive terms (friendly, delightful). The scenarios and moral 
descriptors were taken directly from past work advocating for distinct moral modules (Graham et 
al., 2009). The two positive words were included as attention checks. 
Results 
The two descriptors from each content area were averaged, and correlations were 
calculated between all five moral con-tent areas. Fisher r-to-z transformations revealed that the 
cor-relations between liberals and conservatives did not differ significantly, all ps > .65, and so 
analyses included all par-ticipants together. Analyses revealed that all moral concerns are 
correlated with each other, p < .001. In fact, when all 10 morality adjectives are submitted to a 
reliability analysis, it yields α = .89, suggesting strikingly internal consistency among moral 
concerns (i. e., a single scale). See Tables 1 and 2 for a listing of the correlations between moral 
concerns. 
Although all moral content correlations are significantly positive, the raw correlations 
may underestimate the true latent correlations between moral content. Raw correlation 
coefficients between two operationalizations of x and y are limited by the individual reliability of 
those operationalizations (see Table 1). As MFT moral judgment items possess only modest 
reliability (harm, α = .51; fairness, α = .40; loyalty, α = .46; authority, α = .60; purity, α = .75; 
Graham et al., 2011, Table 2, p. 372), we used the standard correction for attenuation to reveal 
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the latent correlation between moral content (Muchinsky, 1996).6 As can be seen in Table 2, 
distinctness appears to be lacking in these latent construct correlations. 
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CHAPTER 7: Study 6: Translating Across Moral Diversity 
The maximal accessibility and importance of harm (Studies 1-3), combined with its 
organizing ability across moral content (Study 4), and the substantial overlap between harm and 
other moral concerns (Study 5), suggests that harm might be used as a lingua franca—or 
common currency (Bauman, Wisneski, & Skitka, 2012)—between different content (H5: 
Translation). When trying to compare across different moral concerns, harm may serve as a 
natural language for translation. Of course, other moral concerns (each of which involve 
perceived harm—see Study 5) may also allow for translation, but a dyadic template suggests that 
prototypically harm should be the best. 
By analogy, hot peppers can vary along a number of taste dimensions (e.g., smokiness, 
sweetness, size, color), but they are more meaningfully compared with each other on the 
dimension of hotness (i.e., capsaicin). We tested the translational power of harm through 
comparative judgments of immorality and moral content between different scenarios. We 
predicted that differences in immorality between scenarios would be best predicted by 
differences in perceived harm—even for ostensibly “harmless” scenarios. 
Method 
Participants.  
Eighty-seven participants completed the study through mTurk. Twenty-five participants 
failed the attention check, leaving 62 participants (58% female, Mage = 33, 56% liberal). 
Procedure. 
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Participants compared the immorality of the same 10 MFT-generated acts as in Study 5, 2 
drawn from each of five content areas (Graham et al., 2009). As a manipulation check, 
participants first read each story and selected the category that best fit the scenario (harm, unfair, 
disloyal, dis-obedient, and gross). Scenarios were then presented in pairs with participants rating 
which scenarios were more immoral on a 5-point scale from Definitely Action A (1) to 
Definitely Action B (5), with Neither (3) as a midpoint. One comparison asked, for example, 
whether it was more immoral to steal from the poor or eat your dead dog. Next, participants rated 
which action they thought was more harmful, unfair, dis-loyal, disobedient, and gross, using the 
same scale. Participants made 20 comparisons, 2 each between domains. The order of the stories 
within each comparison and the order of the comparisons were randomized. 
Results 
Data were analyzed with a multi-level model that nested comparisons between content 
areas within participants, with politics as a subject-level variable. A dyadic template predicts that 
relative judgments of immorality should be predicted best by relative judgments of harm. As 
predicted, harm had the highest correlation with judgments of immorality: β = .44, SE = 0.03, z = 
17.25, p < .001; followed by unfair: β = .29, SE = 0.03, z = 10.45, p < .001; gross: β = .12, SE = 
0.02, z = 5.36, p < .001; disobedient: β = .06, SE = 0.02, z = 2.83, p < .001; and disloyal: β = .03, 
SE = 0.02, z = 1.24, p = .21. Comparing βs with 95% confidence intervals revealed that harm (CI 
= [0.50, 0.38]) predicted immorality significantly more than all other content areas (see Figure 
7). 
For an even more stringent test of the translational power of harm, we removed all 
comparisons that included harmful scenarios (guarding against the possibility that its relative 
importance was driving both immorality and content judgments). The model revealed similar 
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results with harm best predicting immorality, β = .44, SE = 0.03, z = 13.76, p < .001, providing 
the clearest evidence for harm as a lingua franca because harm mediated between all scenarios 
that were not themselves harmful. 
Politics did not significantly correspond with the immorality judgments when looking at 
all comparisons, or at only the “harmless” act comparisons, βs < .02, ps > .44. Although past 
research has found political differences in the ratings of some of these scenarios (Graham et al., 
2009), relative judgments regarding which scenario was more immoral did not differ 
significantly by politics. There was, however, a significant interaction between politics and 
disloyalty, β = .04, SE = 0.01, z = 2.28, p = .02, suggesting that disloyal ratings were a better 
predictor for immorality ratings for conservatives than for liberals. Nevertheless, liberals were 
still sensitive to disloyalty, and there were no significant political differences observed for 
disobedience or impurity. 
There are many potential metrics on which to compare moral acts, but a dyadic template 
suggests that (prototypic) harm should be the best. Consistent with this idea, the relative 
immorality of two acts was best predicted by harm across moral diversity, and for both liberals 
and conservatives. This further suggests that moral concerns are not incommensurate but can be 
understood through the language of harm. 
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CHAPTER 8: Study 7: Clustering IAT 
Descriptively, some work suggests that moral diversity splits into two correlated clusters: 
Harm and fairness form an “individuating” cluster, whereas disloyalty, disobedience, and purity 
form a “binding” cluster (Graham et al., 2009). The high internal consistency of all moral 
concerns revealed in Study 5 suggests that these claims are substantially overstated. 
Moreover, even descriptive clustering need not reflect psychological processes. A dyadic 
template suggests that diverse moral content should cognitively be linked to harm, even more 
than descriptively similar content. In other words, “impurity” should be more closely linked to 
“harm” than to “disloyalty,” despite previous findings that endorsements of impurity and 
disloyalty are correlated across the political spectrum. Indeed, we suggest that these past 
correlations between politics and impurity/disloyalty stem from specific operationalizations of 
moral concerns that are biased toward conservatism, defining loyalty as patriotism and purity as 
sexual traditionalism. 
As cognitive structure is best revealed by implicit tests, we used two IATs (Greenwald et 
al., 2003) to test associations between harm, loyalty, and impurity. All IATs involve two 
category distinctions (e.g., good/bad, black/white), and by looking at the relative pairing between 
these categories, inferences about implicit associations can be made. In the classic example, if 
participants are faster to categorize black faces when they are paired with bad (vs. good), it is 
evidence of an implicit association between the categories black and bad. In the case of morality, 
we contrast judgments of (a) immoral versus not-immoral and (b) harm-related content versus 
“non-harm” moral content (e.g., disloyalty). We predict that specific immoral acts (e.g., 
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impurity-related acts) cluster better with harm than with non-harm moral content (e.g., 
disloyalty). 
General moral pluralism is consistent with any pattern of judgment, because moral 
pluralism is a statement about descriptive differences and not cognitive mechanisms. However, 
typical interpretations of moral pluralism argue that these descriptive differences correspond to 
the cognitive structure of moral judgment (Haidt, 2012). Conversely, a dyadic template suggests 
that impure acts—to the extent that they seem immoral—should be more closely linked to harm 
than to disloyalty for both liberals and conservatives. 
Study 7a: Impurity and Harm Versus Disloyalty 
This IAT tested whether immoral items related to impurity were better linked to 
disloyalty (as predicted by descriptive analyses; Graham et al., 2011) or to harm (as predicted by 
dyadic morality). 
Method 
Participants. One hundred participants were recruited through mTurk. Twenty-one 
participants were excluded from analysis for incorrectly categorizing more than 20% of the trials, 
leaving 79 participants (56% female, Mage = 38, 47% liberal, all from the United States). 
Procedure. Participants completed an IAT with Content: Harmful/Disloyal and Immoral: 
Immoral/Non-Moral as the categorization pairs. Harmful items included victim, harmful, and 
dangerous. The disloyal items were disloyal, unfaithful, and unpatriotic. To measure the implicit 
associations with purity violations, the immoral items were incest, bestiality, and prostitution, 
and the non-moral items were forget, procrastinate, and boring—all items that are negative in 
valence but non-moral to control for general negativity. Importantly, participants read 
descriptions about the immoral items that defined them as a priori harmless. For example, the 
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case of incest was modeled after the “harmless” consensual incest used by those advocating for 
moral modules (see Haidt, 2001, p. 814). After completing the IAT, participants filled out 
demographics information.  
Results. 
 IATs were conducted with Millisecond by Inquisit, and D-scores were calculated 
automatically according to established guidelines (Greenwald et al., 2003). Positive D-scores 
indicate that impurity-related immorality was more associated with harm than with disloyalty, a 
fellow “binding foundation.” Consistent with a dyadic template, the mean D-score was positive 
(D = .21, SD = 0.69), which a one-sample t test revealed was significantly different from zero, 
t(78) = 2.72, p < .01. The more people saw impurity acts as immoral (vs. non-moral), the more 
they appear to link them to harm over disloyalty. The correlation between the D-score and 
politics was not significant, r(77) = .03, p = .80, revealing similar effects for both liberals and 
conservatives. 
Study 7b: Disloyalty and Harm Versus Impurity  
The first IAT revealed that impurity-related immorality was better linked to harm than to 
disloyalty. However, because the IAT assesses pairs of concepts, the link between purity-related 
immorality and harm may possibly arise because the non-moral terms are linked to disloyalty. 
Although there is no a priori reason to believe that words such as “procrastinate” should be more 
associated with disloyalty than harm, these concerns are best addressed empirically. As a dyadic 
template suggests that disloyalty-related immorality should be better linked to harm than to 
impurity, we reran an IAT using these categories. If we again found a link between disloyalty-
related immorality and harm, it would not be explained by links between impurity/disloyal and 
non-moral terms. 
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Method 
Participants. One hundred participants were recruited through mTurk. Twenty-six 
participants were removed from analysis for low accuracy (failing at least 20%), leaving 74 
participants (59% female, Mage = 37, 53% liberal). 
Procedure. The procedures for this IAT were identical to the previous one, with two 
exceptions. First, the word gross replaced disloyal as the category opposing harmful, with the 
corresponding items disgusting, gross, and filthy. To mea-sure the implicit associations with 
loyalty-related moral violations, the immoral items were adultery, treason, and betrayal. 
Results. 
 Data were analyzed as in the previous study. Positive D-scores indicate that in-group 
moral violations are more associated with harm than with purity, a fellow “binding foundation.” 
The mean D-score was .21, SD = 0.63, which a one-sample t test revealed was significantly 
different from zero, t(73) = 2.89, p < .01. Thus, the more people saw disloyal acts as immoral 
(vs. non-moral), the more they linked them to harm over impurity. There was no significant 
correlation with politics. The correlation between the D-score and politics was not significant, 
r(72) = −.07, p = .28, revealing similar effects for both liberals and conservatives. 
Discussion 
Ratings of immorality of both purity and loyalty violations were more strongly associated 
with harm than with their fellow so-called “binding” content, consistent with a harm-based 
dyadic template. The lack of differences between liberals and conservatives is also consistent 
with a common dyadic template. 
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CHAPTER 9: General Discussion 
Seven studies suggest that harm is central in moral cognition across moral diversity for 
both liberals and conservatives. Across various descriptive moral concerns (harm, fairness, 
disloyalty, disobedience, and impurity), harm is most accessible (H1: Accessible; Study 1) and 
most important (H2: Important; Studies 2 and 3). Harm can meaningfully organize moral 
judgments across moral diversity, predicting the wrongness of even “objectively harmless” acts 
(H3: Organization; Study 4). Although other moral concerns may also organize moral content, 
concerns of harm significantly overlap with other moral concerns—which also overlap with each 
other (H4: Overlap; Study 5). The maximal accessibility and importance of harm, along with its 
overlap and organizational ability, allows harm to be the best lingua franca when comparing 
between moral concerns (H5: Translation; Study 6). Implicit tests also reveal that harm is more 
closely associated with other moral concerns than even descriptively similar concerns (H6: 
Association; Study 7). 
Together, these studies are more consistent with a common dyadic template than with a 
specific number of distinct moral mechanisms that are differentially expressed across liberals and 
conservatives. As various moral content substantially overlap with (the more important) harm, 
different moral concerns can be best understood as different forms of perceived harm. 
Importantly, these studies revealed overwhelming similarity in moral judgments across liberals 
and conservatives. 
Caveats 
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Of course, one must be cautious in the claims made by any single set of studies. In these 
studies, we used a relatively narrow set of stimuli, and it is possible that more diverse stimuli 
will reveal a reduced centrality of harm. However, the stories, labels, and definitions used here 
provide the most challenging test of harm’s centrality, as they were taken directly from past 
research that advocates for distinct moral modules (Graham et al., 2009).We must also 
acknowledge that we did not examine moral judgments across all cultures, but only Americans. 
Nevertheless, researchers advocating for distinct moral modules argue that liberals and 
conservatives represent different moral cultures (Graham et al., 2011). We did reveal some 
descriptive differences in the endorsement of loyalty (Studies 3 and 6) and purity (Study 2), 
consistent with this past work (Graham et al., 2011). However, these differences were 
inconsistent across studies and, even when found, represented only small relative differences 
(consistent with RWA; Altemeyer, 1988) and not categorically different moral judgments. 
To put these findings in context, there were more than 25 analyses across seven studies 
that compared liberals and conservatives on disloyalty, disobedience, and purity. Of these, only 
12% found any differences between liberals and conservatives. Compared with the 
overwhelming power of harm, these other differences were minor, with no results supporting 
past claims that liberals have only a “two-foundation” morality. Most importantly, any 
descriptive differences in explicit endorsement do not appear to reflect underlying cognitive 
differences, as implicit measures revealed no differences between liberals and conservatives. 
We also acknowledge that underlying cognitive structures—whether a dyadic template or 
distinct moral modules—cannot be directly revealed. Nevertheless, we suggest that these studies 
lend evidence to dyadic morality, especially in light of other recent evidence. Studies on dyadic 
completion find that the dyadic template exerts top-down effects on moral judgments (Gray et 
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al., 2014), such that any acts judged to be immoral are automatically perceived as harmful—even 
if they are “objectively harmless.” 
Together, the processes of dyadic comparison (if x is harmful, x is wrong)—revealed 
here—and dyadic completion (if x is wrong, x is harmful) form a dyadic loop, a cognitive 
feedback loop that underlies moral judgment. This loop exerts cognitive gravity—that is, 
constraint satisfaction—that bends perceptions of harm and immorality to be mutually consistent 
(Gray & Schein, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2014; see also Ditto & Liu, 2011; see Figure 8). The 
dyadic loop suggests that harmful actions seem immoral, and immoral actions seem harmful—a 
feedback cycle that may help us understand both political polarization and moral acquisition. 
Small differences in the perceived harm of a norm violation can elevate moral judgment, which 
in turn can elevate perceptions of harm, and so on, until one person believes it is incredibly 
immoral (and harmful) to eat beef and another incredibly immoral (and harmful) to eat pork. 
A Moral Compromise 
A dyadic template represents a synthesis of two long conflicting positions: historical 
cognitive-developmental accounts suggesting that harm is the only legitimate moral concern 
(Turiel et al., 1987), and pluralist accounts suggesting moral diversity (Shweder et al., 1997). A 
common cognitive template within moral diversity affirms the legitimacy of descriptive moral 
diversity but simultaneously highlights the importance of harm within cognition. Nevertheless, 
this compromise may be unsatisfying for those deeply committed to each theory. Cognitive 
developmentalists committed to moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1981) may chafe at the idea that 
moral judgment involves the automatic and intuitive process of dyadic comparison. Likewise, 
moral pluralists may chafe at the idea that diverse moral judgments activate a common cognitive 
template. 
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Beyond understanding the mechanism of cognition, these data also have implications for 
taxonomizing and describing moral diversity. Moral pluralists often discuss moral concerns as if 
they are distinct and equal, and one popular article suggests that harm, fairness, disloyalty, 
disobedience, and impurity are separate and equal (Graham et al., 2011). The current data 
suggest two ways this idea could be modified. First, these concerns—represented by circles—
should not be equal sizes because different concerns vary in importance (Studies 2 and 3). 
Second, the circles should not be distinct but overlap with each other (Study 5). The relative size 
(area) of the circles can be calculated from the odds ratio from Study 3, and the overlap can be 
calculated from squaring (R2) the latent correlation (i.e., adjusted for attenuation/measurement 
error) between content from Study 5. As can be seen in Figure 9, these studies propose a very 
different descriptive moral landscape than suggested by past research. 
Given dyadic morality’s emphasis on perceived harm, some may wonder whether it 
sacrifices pluralism for parsimony, overlooking cultural and political differences. We suggest 
that dyadic morality is not only parsimonious but is actually more consistent with moral 
pluralism. Rather than harm monist modular accounts, dyadic morality advocates for harm 
pluralism and acknowledges the richness of perceived harm, viewing various moral content as 
varieties of perceived harm: Harm can stem from direct physical injury and emo-tional harm, to 
damaging society and your immoral soul. 
Dyadic morality suggests that moral disagreement typically occurs through different 
informational assumptions about who or what is vulnerable to harm (Turiel et al., 1987). Atheists 
deny the existence of souls and so scoff at the idea of religious sin, whereas believers see the 
soul as legitimately vulnerable and so guard against disobeying God. Those who see the poor as 
incapable of suffering will judge redistribution of wealth to be immoral, and those who see 
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fetuses as babies rather than mere cells will judge abortion to be immoral. If conservatives do 
have a wider moral domain (a premise argued against by the current data), this may stem simply 
from the fact that conservatives see relatively more threat in the world (i.e., potential harm; Jost 
et al., 2003).Dyadic morality also acknowledges that liberals and conservatives legitimately 
differ on specific issues, but we suggest that modular accounts have misrepresented these 
differences. Research finds that MFT has used a biased sample of stimuli when assessing 
political variability in morality (Gray & Keeney, 2015), asking questions about rolling in urine 
and bizarre plastic surgery, but not taxation, gun control, euthanasia, capital punishment, or 
environmentalism. 
How can a theory of moral disagreement ignore the most contentious and representative 
cases of disagreement? By using only issues outlined by RWA for loyalty, disobedience, and 
impurity (see Kugler et al., 2014), it is unsurprising that MFT studies revealed that conservatives 
care more about these ideas. Conservatives may care more about “purity” when it is defined as 
religiosity and traditionalism but likely not when it is defined as environmentalism or organic 
foods. Likewise, liberals may seem more individualistic regarding patriotism but likely not when 
concerning taxation or gun rights. Descriptive taxonomies are undoubtedly useful, but only when 
they accurately catalog all of moral diversity, rather than a small subset of specific issues known 
a priori to show political differences (Haidt, 2012). 
Future Directions 
Any new theory must provide directions for future research, and we suggest seven. 
First, how does a template of harm translate into different judgments of right and wrong 
across cultures? The same question was asked of evolution: How can one com-mon process 
provide the richness of biological diversity? With evolution, the key is determining the selective 
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pressures of specific environments; with morality, the key may be determining what varieties of 
harm cultures face (or perceive they face). Cultures with high prevalence of sexual diseases 
likely moralize sexual chastity (van Leeuwen, Park, Koenig, & Graham, 2012), cultures with 
many food-borne illnesses likely develop food-related taboos, and cultures constantly at war 
likely moralize group cohesion. In addition to anthropological studies, lab studies could examine 
links between perceived threat and moralization. As discussed above, we suggest that the dyadic 
loop could spark a feedback cycle that amplifies small (and potentially random) initial cultural 
differences in perceived harm/immorality. 
Second, what role does perceived harm play in acquiring morality? As adults, it may 
seem that some things seem wrong simply because of entrenched childhood learning, but does 
childhood learning involve perceptions of harm? Dyadic morality predicts that children most 
easily moralize obviously harmful acts and that parents’ use of harm-based language will most 
successfully moralize other cultural conventions. 
Third, what role does perceived harm play in judgments of moral character? Recent work 
suggests that morality often involves judgments of people rather than acts (Goodwin, 2015; 
Uhlmann, Pizarro, & Diermeier, 2015). Dyadic morality suggests that judgments of character 
ultimately revolve around potential harm. Although some studies find that “impure” acts (e.g., 
chicken masturbation) reflect more poorly upon character than “harmful” acts (e.g., theft; 
Uhlmann & Zhu, 2013), these impure acts are much weirder than the harmful acts (Gray & 
Keeney, 2015). We suggest that this weirdness leads others to view people as unpredictable and 
dangerous (Gray & Keeney, 2015). 
Fourth, what is the role of motivational processes in dyadic morality? Dyadic comparison 
and completion are often dis-cussed as inevitable consequences of a dyadic template, but 
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motivation can likely accelerate or dampen these processes. Those who want to find a person 
blameworthy will likely see their actions as more harmful than someone who wants to for-give 
them. 
Fifth, what is the best taxonomy of perceived harm? Different cultures clearly differ on 
what they see as vulnerable to damage (Shweder et al., 1997). What is the best system to 
represent these differences? One possibility is to focus on the identity of the recipient of harm, as 
Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) do by separating harm to the future self (e.g., drug use), harm 
to a specific other (e.g., murder), and harm to the group (e.g., cheating on taxes). Alternatively, 
one may focus on the method of harm, such as physical, mental, or spiritual. Although MFT 
appears not to describe the cognitive processes underlying moral judgments, a reformulation of 
this theory may represent a useful taxonomy of perceived harm. 
Sixth, how does the dyadic template translate into good-ness? Morality is not only about 
harm but also helping (i.e., alleviating the suffering of victims)—Is there a dyadic help-based 
template for virtue? 
Seventh—and perhaps most importantly—how can a dyadic template help solve political 
conflict? If people all speak the same moral “language” of harm (Mikhail, 2007), we should be 
able to translate moral issues across partisan divides. More specifically, by granting legitimacy to 
our political opponent’s perceptions of harm, we may be more accepting of their views and more 
willing to engage in discussion. 
Conclusion 
The eminent anthropologist Richard Shweder is an advocate of both moral pluralism and 
the idea of “moral universalism without the uniformity” (Shweder, 2012, p. 88). He suggests that 
people across cultures would arrive at the same moral judgment if they had a “full specification 
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of circumstances and context” (Wiggins, 1990; cited in Shweder, 2012, p. 95). What exactly are 
these circumstances and context? Perhaps perceived harm. 
The moral dyad allows for “universalism without the uniformity,” because it provides a 
common structure for understanding moral cognition, while allowing diversity in the perceived 
methods and recipients of harm. In con-trast to other theories that divide up moral judgments—
and the cultures who make them—into discrete bins, the moral dyad unifies morality. Despite 
ubiquitous moral disagreement, each of us seems to share a common cognitive template. Inside 
the moral minds of both liberals and conservatives beats the heart of harm. 
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Table 1 
Raw Correlations Between Five Moral Content 
Areas (Study 5) 
Content Area 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Harm    — 
2. Fairness .59 —      
3. Disloyalty .59 .83 —    
4. Disobedience .62 .73 .75  — 
5. Impurity .55 .44 .55 .49         — 
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Table 2 
Latent Correlations Between Five Moral Content Areas, 
Corrected for Attenuation (Study 5) 
Content Area 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Harm 
   
— 
2. Fairness 1.0 —      
3. Disloyalty 1.0 1.0 —    
4. Disobedience 1.0 1.0 1.0  — 
5. Impurity .89 .81 .93 .73         — 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
44
Figure 1.  Free-recalled words from Study 1 across both liberals and conservatives. Size of word 
reflects frequency of recall.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Given their similarity, killing was combined with murder; theft with stealing; infidelity, cheating on spouse, and 
affair with adultery; punching/ kicking a child with child abuse 
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Figure 2. Participant categorization of free-recall act (Study 1). 
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Figure 3.  Perceived wrongness of various moral content for both liberals and conservatives 
(Study 2).  Error bars are +/-1 Std. Err. 
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Figure 4.  Comparing the importance of moral content area with each other via asymmetry scores 
(Study 3).  Included are t values and odds ratios—which give the relative importance of moral 
concern (e.g., Harm is 8.32 times more important than disloyalty).  Scores not listed are not 
significant (e.g., there is no difference in importance between disloyal and disobedience) 
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Figure 5. Average time for categorizing an act as immoral and harmful by item (Study 4). 
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Figure 6.  Average time for categorizing an act as immoral and harmful, split by politics (Study 
4). 
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Figure 7. The ability of various moral content to serve as a moral common currency (Study 6). 
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Figure 8. The Dyadic Loop.  The bottom-up and top-down feedback cycle of the dyadic 
template.   
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Figure 9. Descriptive moral content implied by moral foundations theory (top), contrasted with 
that revealed by Studies 3 and 5 (bottom).  
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